I. INTRODUCTION
In Davis v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court resolved how law enforcement officers should respond during custodial interrogation of a suspect, when that suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel. The Court held that, after suspects knowingly and voluntarily waive the rights articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 2 law enforcement officers may continue questioning them until and unless they clearly request an attorney. 3 The Court in Davis believed that the suspect's remark, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not a clear request for counsel and, thus, held that the law enforcement officers did not violate the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by continuing to question him. 4 This Note first addresses Supreme Court precedent safeguarding the Fifth Amendment and then explores the three approaches to ambiguous requests for counsel that state and circuit courts developed prior to Davis. This Note then argues that the Court's ruling ignores the central precepts of the Miranda case law and fails to provide adequate measures to counter the realities of custodial interrogations. Additionally, this Note argues that the Court should have promulgated a rule that obligates law enforcement officers to clarify any ambiguity before further questioning suspects. To effectively safeguard suspects' privileges under the Fifth Amendment, this obligation to clarify should prohibit law enforcement officers from badgering suspects into converting their previously ambiguous request for counsel into a clear waiver of the right to counsel. If any ambiguity remains, the officers should consider the request an invocation of the right to
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FIFTH AMENDMENT ever ambiguous or equivocal, requires the immediate cessation of the interrogation. 2 1 Other jurisdictions required a suspect's mention of counsel to meet a "threshold standard of clarity," 22 with comments falling short of the threshold not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. 23 Still other jurisdictions held that all questioning must immediately cease in response to an ambiguous reference to counsel, but the interrogators may ask questions designed to clarify the individual's desires concerning counsel. 24 The Supreme Court had previously declined to promulgate a uniform rule with respect to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal request for or reference to counsel. 25 In Smith v. Ilinois, 26 a suspect had responded to Miranda warnings by stating to the police "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that." 27 Concluding that this was an unambiguous request for counsel, the Court determined that it was unnecessary to formulate a rule to handle ambiguous statements. 28 In Connecticut v. Bar 
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lives replied that the news media, not the police, were calling it murder and that only two people knew what really happened and one of them was dead. 40 Krueger then asked the officers how they knew the stabbing was not in self-defense. 4 1 The detectives said they did not know the circumstances and that was the reason they wanted to talk to him about it. 42 Krueger then signed a statement implicating himself in the murder. 43 The Illinois Supreme Court held that because Krueger's ambiguous request did not reach the threshold of clarity, interrogating officers did not violate his Miranda rights. 4 " According to that court, "a more positive indication or manifestation of a desire for an attorney was required than was made here." 45 Although the court in Krueger acknowledged that the phrase "in any manner" asserted in the Court's holding in Miranda permits assertions of the right to counsel that are not unmistakably clear, the court did not read Miranda as requiring every reference to an attorney, no matter how ambiguous, to constitute an invocation of the light to counsel. 4 The court in Krueger noted that the defendant was not subjected to any coercion in excess of what is inherent in all custodial interrogations. 47 Furthermore, the court believed that the detectives apparently acted in good faith in notjudging the defendant's statements to be a request for counsel. 48 While the court felt that it shouid not unduly emphasize the detectives' subjective beliefs, it recognized the importance of allowing law enforcement officials some discretion in this determination. 49 The court then found the officers' beliefs to be reasonable under the circumstances. 50 Because the defendant's manifestation of his right to an attorney failed to reach some requisite level of clarity, the court concluded that the police had not violated the defendant's Miranda rights. 5 
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When the district attorney arrived less than an hour later, he explained the defendant's rights and recorded the confession. Even though this second confession occurred after the defendant's confusion was clarified, the court held it to be equally inadmissible. While the defendant's subsequent statement indicated that he finally understood his rights, the district attorney nonetheless violated those rights by continuing to interrogate him without defense counsel present-64
C. THE CLARIFICATION RULE
The Fifth Circuit developed the clarification rule in Nash v. Estelle, 6 5 where it held that when suspects express their desires ambiguously, law enforcement officials may make further inquiry aimed only at clarifying the suspect's desires. 66 The court in Nash believed that the Supreme Court contemplated this situation in Miranda. 6 7 The Court in Miranda noted that "[i]f [a suspect] is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive counsel. Situations of this kind must necessarily be left to the judgment of the interviewing Agent" 6 8 Furthermore, the Court's holding in Mosely shunned any attempt to impose "permanent immunity from further interrogation .... ,"69 In Nash, after the district attorney informed the suspect of his rights, the suspect expressed both a desire for counsel and a desire to continue the interview withhe expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer, was promptly told that if he couldn't afford a lawyer, he would have to wait until the next day to have one appointed for him. Then, with scarcely a pause, let alone a cessation of questioning, and without honoring his request for counsel, the police continued interrogation about the car, and the confession ensued. The prosecutor acknowledged the defendant's request and told him that the interrogation would have to end immediately. This prompted the defendant to say, "I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you." 72 Soon thereafter, the prosecutor obtained both a waiver and a confession from the defendant. 73 The district court concluded that the defendant asked for an attorney. 74 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the defendant never requested the assistance of counsel during questioning. 75 Rather, the Fifth Circuit felt that the defendant only wanted assurance that he could still have counsel appointed in the future if he discussed his involvement in the murder with the prosecutor at that moment. 7 6 The court looked to the transcript of the interrogation and the surrounding circumstances to hold that the district court was clearly erroneous in its interpretation. The defendant had been ap- FIFTH AME)MENT prehended a week earlier and had orally confessed to the murder at that time. To stop the interrogation at that moment, according to the court, "would have denied to [the defendant] his true desire to explain himself and to continue with the interview." 77 Moreover, it would be improper to assume that the prosecutor was a "devious trickster, who desired to subtly manipulate" 7 8 the defendant, when in fact the transcript disclosed that he "fairly and evenly" apprised the defendant of his rights and clarified the situation, 7 9
M. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of 2 October 1988, Robert L. Davis and Keith Shackleton, 80 both members of the United States Navy, played a game of pool at the Enlisted Men's Club on the Charleston (South Carolina) Naval Base. 8 ' Shackleton lost the game and a thirty dollar wager, which he refused to pay. 8 2 Early the next morning his body was found behind the commissary, a short distance from the club. 83 He had been beaten to death with a blunt object.8 4 During their investigation of the crime, agents for the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) discovered that Davis visited the club that evening and that he was absent without leave from his responsibilities the next morning. 8 5 The agents also learned that only privatelyowned pool cues could be taken from the club, and that only four people, including Davis, had their own cues at the club that flight. 78 Id. at 520. 79 Id. The dissent in Nash rejected the clarification approach and disagreed with the majority's application of this rule to the facts of the case. Id. at 52 (Godbold, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, after the suspect's request for counsel, the prosecutor did not limit his questioning to clarification, but instead intended to elicit a waiver and confession. Id. at 526 (Godbold,J., dissenting). The equivocal nature of the defendant's request resulted only from further questioning after an unambiguous and unequivocal request. Id. at 524 (Godbold, J., dissenting). The dissent considered the relevant exchange as follows:
NASH 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
NIS agents first interviewed Davis on 20 October 1988.87 Davis admitted that he was at the club that night and that he had played pool with Shackleton. 88 Davis then explained that he had heard from Wade Bielby and Bonnie Krusen that Shackleton was beaten with a pool stick. 89 At the end of the interview, Davis turned over his pool cues to the NIS agents and explained that the stain on the case was probably catsup, but possibly his own blood. 90 Later, various sailors told the agents that Davis "either had admitted committing the crime or had recounted details that clearly indicated his involvement in the killing." 9 '
On 4 November 1988, NIS agents arrested Davis at the Naval Hospital, where he had been held in the psychiatric ward since October 28.92 The agents escorted him to the NIS office and handcuffed him to a chair. 93 The agents told Davis that he was a suspect in the killing, that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he had the right to counsel and to have counsel present during the interrogation. 94 Davis waived these rights, both orally and in writing. 95 During the first part of the interrogation, Davis described his ac- 1°3 When the agents confronted Davis with evidence that he had in fact told someone that he killed Shackleton, Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else." 10 4 At that moment the agents ceased questioning him. 10 5 At the general court-martial, the military judge denied Davis' motion to suppress the statements he made during his interrogation. 106 The court held that "the mention of a lawyer by the accused during the course of the interrogation [was] not in the form of a request for counsel and.., the agents properly determined that the accused was not indicating a desire for or invoking his right to counsel." 1 0 7 The general court-martial convicted Davis of unpremeditated murder' The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence of the trial court. 1 10 Without comment, the court rejected all of Davis' arguments as meritless. 11 The United States Court of Military Appeals granted discretionary review and affirmed." 2 The court recognized the three different approaches to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel:
Some jurisdictions have held that any mention of counsel, however ambiguous, is sufficient to require that all questioning cease. Others have attempted to define a threshold standard of clarity for invoking the right Arizona' 26 created "a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel." 127 Specifically, if a suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning until an attorney is present or the suspect re-initiates the conversation. 128 Justice O'Connor believed that Edwards, which held that the knowing and intelligent waiver standard protects the right to counsel, was "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights." 129 Justice O'Connor believed that this prohibition on further questioning, like other aspects of Miranda, "is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose." 13 0
Justice O'Connor next focused on the application of Miranda and Edwards to Davis. 13 1 Justice O'Connor determined that courts faced with the question of whether a suspect actually invoked the right to counsel must make an objective inquiry to avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations.' 3 2 To invoke the Miranda right to counsel, a suspect must "at a minimum [make a] statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attomey."
13 3 Most significantly, Justice O'Connor determined that Supreme Court precedent does not require clarifying questions or the cessation of an interrogation unless the suspect articulates a clear desire to have counsel present-i.e., clear enough for a reasonable police officer under the circumstances to interpret the statement as a request for an attorney.'3 Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had previously concluded that "a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not."' u 5 Justice O'Connor interpreted later Supreme Court case law to explain that Edwards does not mandate that the in-SUPREME COURT REVIEW terrogation cease. 136 Justice O'Connor rejected Davis' suggestion to broaden the scope of Edwards to require that police officers stop questioning at the moment a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel.' 3 7 Justice O'Connor reasoned that such a rule "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity,"' 3 8 and would needlessly prevent police officers from questioning an unrepresented suspect if the suspect did not wish to have the assistance of counsel.' 3 9 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court in Miranda stated that "if a suspect is 'indecisive in his request for counsel,' the officers need not always cease questioning."
14
Justice O'Connor recognized that a rule "requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects whobecause of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not clearly articulate their right although they actually want to have a lawyer present." 14 1 However, Justice O'Connor believed that the Miranda warnings were sufficient to "dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." 142 And the suspect must affirmatively invoke the additional protection of Edwards by requesting an attorney. 143 Justice O'Connor then focused on "the other side of the Miranda equation: the need for effective law enforcement." 144 Edwards provides a bright line for officers that does not unduly hamper real-world investigation.
14 5 According to Justice O'Connor, a rule that requires police officers to cease their questioning if a suspect makes an ambiguous statement that may or may not be a request for an attorney would force police officers to engage in guesswork. 46 Justice O'Connor recognized that when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement "it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officer to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney." 14 7 However, Justice O'Connor declined to adopt a rule re- [Vol. 85 FFTH AMENDMENT quiring officers to ask clarifying questions. In the end, the Court was unwilling to create "a third layer of prophylaxis" beyond Miranda and Edwards that would prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. 148 Justice O'Connor then deferred to the lower court's conclusion that Davis' statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not a reasonably clear request for counsel. 149 Justice O'Connor saw no reason to disturb that conclusion. 1 50 Thus, the NIS agents did not have to cease questioning Davis.
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE Although Justice Scaliajoined with the majority, he wrote a separate concurring opinion to address the separation of powers issue that the majority ignored. 151 Justice Scalia believed that 18 U.S.C. § 3501, "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions," 15 2 should apply. 153 The majority declined to consider this statute because the government expressly declined to argue it and because the issue was one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal statute.' 5 4 However, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's refusal to consider the statute, arguing that legal analysis of the admissibility of a confession without reference to the statute was "an unreal exercise."' 55 Justice Scalia noted that every presidential administration has generally avoided this provision since its enactment in 1968.156 Even though Justice Scalia ultimately agreed with the Court that judgment 148 Id. at 2356-57. may be properly rendered here, he warned that as far as he was concerned, the next time the Court is confronted with this predicament, it will consider the statute. 15 7 According to Justice Scalia, while the Executive has the power to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure to prosecute, once a prosecution has been commenced and a confession introduced, the Executive has neither the power nor right to determine what objections to the admissibility of a confession are valid in law.' 58 In sum, Justice Scalia believed that the Court's continuing refusal to consider § 3501 was not consistent with the Judiciary's obligation to decide according to the law. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE Justice Souter 160 concurred in the judgment. Justice Souter voted to affirm Davis' conviction because he believed that the Constitution does not prevent law enforcement officers from asking questions limited to clarifying whether suspects intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 16 1 Justice Souter upheld Davis' conviction because he believed that Davis had made the self-incriminating statements only after the officers had apparently clarified his desire to continue without an attorney. 162 However, Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's ruling that the officers had no obligation to clarify what a suspect meant by an equivocal statement that could reasonably be understood as a request for counsel. 163 Justice Souter could notjoin in establishing a rule that would allow the investigators to disregard a suspect's reference to a lawyer-even if that reference, though ambiguous, could reasonably be understood as a request for counsel. Justice Souter noted that Supreme Court precedent and a substantial body of state and circuit court law argue against the majority's differentiation between suspects who ambiguously assert their right to counsel and those who do so unambiguously. 165 In Justice Souter's view, "[t]he concerns of fairness and practicality that have long anchored our Miranda case law point to a different response: when law enforcement officials 'reasonably do not know whether the suspect wants a lawyer,' they should stop their interrogation and ask him to make his choice clear." 168 According to Justice Souter, a rule requiring investigators to determine the meaning of a suspect's equivocal statement before initiating further interrogation would satisfy the two ambitions of nearly thirty years of case law addressing the relationship between police and criminal suspects in custodial interrogation. First, it would ensure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. 167 Second, it would ensure that the justification for Miranda rules remain consistent with practical realities. Justice Souter then demonstrated how the Court's approach fails to adhere to these two principles. 16 9 According to Justice Souter, suspects who are "'thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures' would seem an odd group to single out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care." 17 0 The many suspects who lack a confident command of the English language will be sufficiently intimidated or overwhelmed by their predicament that they will lose the ability to speak assertively.' 7 ' Justice Souter further argued that the standard governing waivers of the right to counsel does not distinguish between initial waivers and later decisions to reinvoke them. According to Justice Souter, Miranda's objective was to guarantee "a continuous opportunity to exercise [the right of silence] ." 172 Justice Souter criticized the Court's toleration of the fact that some poorly expressed requests for counsel will be disregarded. Finally, Justice Souter focused on the threat to the core of Fifth Amendment protection. 178 He feared that the majority's approach will not adequately protect the inarticulate or intimidated suspect.'
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After attempting to invoke a right to counsel that falls short of the majority's standard, a suspect "may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation." 8 0 Furthermore, Justice Souter found no precedent dictating that interrogators may presume that an ambiguous statement is not a request for counsel and continue questioning. 18 Thus, Justice Souter argued that clarification was the "intuitively sensible course." 182 Justice Souter then challenged the Court's assertion that its rule will promote more effective law enforcement and maintain the "ease of application." 18 3 First, he asserted that while the confessions lost due to clarification extract a real price from society, it is a price that the Court in Miranda determined should be borne.1 8 4 Second, he noted that the question "how clear is clear?" is not so easily answered in police stations and trial courts. 185 Unlike the majority rule, the clarification approach would guarantee that the "judgment call' will be made by the party most competent to resolve the ambiguity, who our case law has always assumed should make it: the individual suspect."' 8 6
Turning to the petitioner's argument that even ambiguous requests require an end to all police questioning, Justice Souter stressed that he was unwilling to adopt such a rule.' 87 According to Justice Souter, ceasing the interrogation when a suspect unambiguously expresses a desire for it to continue could potentially impede the strong bias favoring individual choice.' 8 8
Justice Souter ended with a look towards the future. 189 He noted that the Court should adopt the rule proposed by the petitioner if experience reveals that less drastic means are ineffective to safeguard [Vol. 85 FITH AMENDMENT suspects' rights. 90 In conclusion, Justice Souter hoped that the Court's ruling would not lead to trial courts demanding "suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don" and that interrogators would continue to follow "good police practice" and ask clarifying questions. 191 V. ANALYSIS Until Davis, state and federal courts had promulgated three distinct approaches to determine whether a suspect's ambiguous reference to an attorney invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The majority in Davis adopted the threshold of clarity approach: a suspect's reference to counsel must reach a high threshold level of clarity to constitute an invocation of the right to counsel. 19 2 If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for a lawyer, law enforcement officers do not have an obligation to stop the interrogation. 193 Furthermore, officers are not required to attempt to clarify such ambiguities.' 9 4 Justice Souter, in his concurrence, advocated for the clarification approach: when suspects make an ambiguous reference to an attorney, interrogators should stop their interrogation and clarify the suspect's desires. 195 The per se approach, which no member of the Court supported, regarded an ambiguous reference to an attorney as an invocation of the right to counsel. 196 The per se approach demanded the complete cessation of questioning if a suspect's ambiguous statement could be reasonably, understood as a request for counsel. 19 7 The petitioner in Davis attempted to put a twist on this line of reasoning by distinguishing between ambiguous references to counsel and ambiguous requests for counsel. 198 Ultimately, none of these approaches satisfactorily protects the constitutional rights illuminated in Miranda. The Davis threshold of clarity approach construes Supreme Court precedent too narrowly and fails to balance the competing demands of effective law enforcement and constitutional safeguards. The per se approach, including the variation advocated by the petitioner, would constrain effective 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW law enforcement. The clarification approach similarly fails to strike a proper balance among these competing factors. A more focused version of the clarification approach would provide an effective response to ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel in the custodial setting.
A.
PROBLEMS WITH THE THREE MAJOR APPROACHES
The Davis Threshold of Clarity Approach
The Davis threshold of clarity approach fails to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of a suspect confronted with custodial interrogation. The Court in Miranda, discussing the coercive nature of these interrogations, believed that such an environment "carries its own badge of intimidation" and may not only be physically intimidating, but a threat to human dignity as well.' 9 9 Common sense and social science suggest that people who feel powerless or intimidated are more likely to resort to unintentionally equivocal language. 20 0 To secure a statement that is truly the product of the suspect's free choice, adequate procedures are necessary to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." The Davis rule has another weakness. Equivocal language is not just a product of the "inherently coercive" atmosphere of the custodial environment-it is also the everyday expression and conversation tool for many people. A serious flaw in the Davis rule is its "implicit assumption that direct and assertive speech . .. is, or should be, the norm." 20 2 Some people are less likely to speak in a direct manner or use assertive speech patterns. Such indirect speech patterns are "the hallmark of a pragmatic usage by persons without power, and can be found both in . . . female [speech patterns] and in the adaptive speech patterns of subordinated African Americans forced to deal with white authority figures." 20 3 Under Davis, these groups are more likely to inadvertently waive the right to counsel. 20 4 While the majority in Davis stated that suspects need not articulate their invocation "with the discrimination of an Oxford don," 205 The Davis threshold of clarity approach wrongly forces suspects, "on pain of losing a constitutional right," 2 07 to select their words with a level of precision that ignores real world expression and articulation. 20 8 Justice Souter appropriately argued that suspects who are "'thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures' would seem an odd group to single out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care." 20 9 Indeed, resolving ambiguity against the suspect actually rewards the experienced criminal, who is less likely to be unnerved by the situation. 210 Thus, the majority's approach operates most severely on the "ignorant and unsophisticated suspect-that is, the suspect who has the most need for constitutional safeguards.
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The Davis threshold of clarity approach will lead to the denial of counsel as a result of some poorly expressed desires for counsel.
12
The majority defends this inevitability on the ground that Miranda warnings sufficiently dilute the coercion inherent in the-custodial setting. 2 13 However, even the Court in Miranda recognized the limits of its own rule: "a once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation cannot itself suffice [to] ... assure that the... right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process." 214 In sum, Miranda and Edwards cannot effectively safeguard rights guaranteed in the Constitution if interrogators can simply ignore a request for counsel that fails to meet a threshold level of clarity unattainable by many in the real world. 215 
The Per Se Approach
The viability of the per se approach has two significant problems. First, it imposes an unreasonable strain on reasonable law enforce-
